




Private Student Loan Asset Backed Securities: 









The Honors Program 
Senior Capstone Project 
Student’s Name: Nicholas Gentile 
Faculty Sponsor: Dr. Peter Nigro 
April 2013 
Private Student Loan Asset Backed Securities: A Default Curve Analysis 
Senior Capstone Project for Nicholas Gentile________________________________________ 
2 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ......................................................................................................................................................... 3 
Section I: Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 4 
Section II: Literature Review ........................................................................................................................ 9 
Origins and Development of Student Lending.......................................................................................... 9 
Development of the Private Market ........................................................................................................ 14 
FFEL Loan Characteristics ..................................................................................................................... 19 
Private Loan Characteristics ................................................................................................................... 22 
Major Players in the Private Loan Market .............................................................................................. 27 
Section III: Data .......................................................................................................................................... 39 
Section IV: Empirical Results ..................................................................................................................... 44 
Univariate Tests ...................................................................................................................................... 44 
Multivariate Models ................................................................................................................................ 59 
Section V: Econometric Challenges and Methods ...................................................................................... 64 
Section VI: Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 65 
Appendices .................................................................................................................................................. 66 
Appendix I: Descriptive Statistics ........................................................................................................... 66 






Private Student Loan Asset Backed Securities: A Default Curve Analysis 




Business and mainstream media devote significant attention to the student lending industry and 
its possible threat to the economy.  While the private loan component of student lending may not 
be largest part of this one trillion dollar industry, it is likely to be the space where evidence 
supporting the media’s concerns are found.  This paper examines the variation in cumulative 
default rates for private student loan asset backed securities issued between 2001 and 2007, 
revealing the dynamics of these opaque financial instruments.  The study analyzes internal pool 
data and external economic data, uncovering the primary factors that shape the respective 
cumulative default curves for each trust.  The data reveals that the cumulative default curves are 
influenced by both underwriting procedures of the originator and the timeframe that the trust 
enters its repayment period.  This paper provides detailed industry research and pool-level trust 
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Section I: Introduction 
In 2010, total outstanding student loan debt surpassed total credit card debt for the first time.  At 
that time, federal student loans represented $665 billion of the total (80%) with private student 
loans comprising the remainder (20%).  In May 2012 the “student loan debt clock” surpassed $1 
trillion in total loans. Figure 1 shows steady student loan growth over the last decade. . These 
figures, however, do not include capitalized interest for federal education loans which could add 
6 to 7 percent to the total amount (FinAid 2012) The rise in outstanding student debt, combined 
with rising default rates (13.4% within 3 years of graduation, lifetime projected at 23% for loans 
originated in 2013), is leading to speculation over the stability of the student lending market 







The student lending industry is very intricate.  The combination of federal and private loan 
varieties creates a complex system which involves academic institutions, guarantee agencies, 
investors, borrowers and their families.  Figure 2 provides for a representation of these 
Figure 1: Outstanding Student Loan Debt (2003-2012) 
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relationships.  The diagram demonstrates the complexity of the student lending process, both due 
to the number of parties involved, as well as the various transfers of funds. 
 







The federal loan program is the most widely used tool to finance higher education, making up 
over two-thirds of all post-secondary aid (College Board 2011).  For the 2010-2011 academic 
year, federal guaranteed loans comprised 93% of the $112 billion in originated student loans.  
While the federal loan market is much larger than the private market, the latter represents an 
important part of higher education funding, which in the words of the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (2012), “does not appear to be well understood by the public”. 
Over the past few years, policy makers, government agencies and the media are increasingly 
worried that student loans represent the next financial bubble.  In 2011, Moody’s Analytics 
reported that, “Fears of a bubble in educational spending are not without merit” (Kingkade 2011).  
In 2012, Forbes put out an article with the title, “Student Loan Bubble Sets up to be Subprime 
Figure 2: Student Lending Process 
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Disaster Part Deux” (Bonner 2012). More recently, Time Magazine asked, “Student Loan Debt 
Crisis: How’d We Get Here and What Happens Next?” (While 2013).  The general tone of 
public opinion appears to center around the belief that the student lending market poses the risks 
and poses a huge threat to the economy 
Over the past two decades, securitization emerged as a popular method of financing student 
loans, serving as both an attractive investment for yield-seeking investors, and providing funding 
for additional student lending for both federal and private institutions.  Securitization pools 
individual loans into securities that are backed by the future cash flows that borrowers make in 
repayment (Lee & Egan 2009). Figure 3 shows the growth in the securitized student loan market 
both in terms of annual issuance and loans outstanding.  As of the fourth quarter of 2012, there 
were $232 billion in student loan asset backed securities (SLABs) outstanding, down from a 
peak of $242 billion the year before (SIFMA 2012). Additionally, in 2012, $26 billion of new 







 Figure 3: SLAB Issuance & Total Outstanding (1990-2012) 
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Securitized pools are constructed from loans originated by the issuer, purchased from other 
originators by the issuer, or a combination of the two.  Student loan securitizations can also be 
characterized by the type of loan; either federal or private.  SLABs can contain one or both types 
of student loans.  Federal loans are guaranteed by the state entity which originated the loan, 
which is then reinsured by the federal government.  This guarantee does not guarantee the timely 
payment of principal and interest on the SLAB, but rather on the underlying loan itself.  In the 
event of default, the loan holder (in the case of a securitization, the trustee) can submit a claim to 
the guarantee agency, which submits a claim to the reinsurance provider, the U.S. Department of 
Education (Lee & Egan 2009). This means that, implicitly, federal loans are backed by the full 
faith and credit of the United States.   
Until 2008, the private lending market created its own version of a guarantee agency.  The main 
player was The Education Resources Institute (TERI), a non-profit formed by a collection of 
Massachusetts schools.  Working with First Marblehead bank, at its peak, TERI guaranteed over 
$16 billion in private student loans.  Following its bankruptcy in 2008, private originators/issuers 
were left to either use other third-party guarantors, or simply issue the SLABs without any 
guarantee (CFPB 2012).  Individuals and institutions that fear student lending becoming the next 
financial bubble should focus their concerns on the unguaranteed private loans that comprise a 
major portion of some SLABs, rather than those backed mainly by government guaranteed loans.  
Fitch Ratings echoed this sentiment in a recent report on the student lending market,  
“Fitch believes that the recent increase in past-due and defaulted student 
loans presents a risk to investors in private student loan ABS, but not those in 
ABS trusts backed by FFELP [federal] loans.  While FFELP loans are largely 
protected from these trends [underemployment and unemployment], private 
student loan trusts, especially those that were structured aggressively and 
with less stringent credit standards before the recession, are expected to 
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continue experiencing high defaults and ratings pressure” (Business Insider 
2012) 
Further parallels exist between the subprime crisis and the student lending industry.  Two of the 
main causal factors of the subprime crisis were predatory lending and predatory borrowing.  
David Musto (2008), a finance professor at Wharton, identifies predatory lending as making a 
loan that reduces the expected welfare of the borrower by having an expectation that the loan 
will end in default. A more controversial discussion centers on the concept of predatory 
borrowing: the idea that individuals take out loans with at least some knowledge that they will be 
unable to maintain the debt.   
This paper attempts to identify a significant difference in the default curves for private student 
loans issued pre-crisis (2007-2008), and, if a difference is found, to explain the variation with 
causal factors.  While the private market is comparatively small, only 20% of outstanding loans 
and 7% of new issuances, the general lack of oversight, regulation, and awareness makes it an 
important research opportunity.  In addition to the scarcity of research on the topic, the private 
student lending market carries risks that are alleged to be a threat to the financial system of the 
United States.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II reviews the literature related to 
student lending.  Emphasis is placed on the development of the market from the mid-1960s to 
today in an effort to show what developments led to the current situation.  Additionally, the 
federal loan market is discussed in order to highlight similarities and differences with the private 
loan market.  While the literature specifically focused on the private student loan industry is 
limited at best, it is featured in detail, along with an overview of the major players in the space. 
Section III describes the data used in the paper.  Section IV provides empirical results. Section V 
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discusses the various econometric challenges faced in this study and the methods used in light of 
those challenges. Lastly, Section IV provides a conclusion and discussion of areas of further 
research. 
By conducting this research, this report sheds light on an opaque, yet potentially ominous, part of 
the American financial system.  By addressing the CFPB’s (2012) claim that private student 
lending is “not well understood by the public,” this study reveals the dynamics of the market that 
are driving what many fear, is a ticking time-bomb.  
Section II: Literature Review 
Origins and Development of Student Lending 
The student lending industry traces its origins back to the Higher Education Act of 1965.  
Section 421 of the Act established the Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP), 
providing a federal program of student loan insurance for students or lenders, paid a portion of 
the interest on loans to qualified students, guaranteed a portion of each loan insured under the 
program. As shown in Figure 4, the FFELP loan volume and average loan amounts have 
increased over time (Rust 2009).  
 
  
       
 
 
Figure 4:FFELP Loan Volume & Average Loan Amount (1966-2005) 
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The Act put forth ideas for “default reduction activities,” including a program of partial loan 
cancellation to reward disadvantaged borrowers for good repayment behavior, establishing a 
financial and debt management counseling program, establishing a program of placing high-risk 
borrowers in jobs, and developing public service announcements that would detail the 
consequences of student loan default (P.L. 89-329 1965).  There is little evidence that these plans 
were ever developed after the adoption of the Act. 
Following the Higher Education Act, student loans were more or less treated like any other form 
of debt.  The 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act amended the U.S. Bankruptcy Code to exclude 
educational loans made, insured, or guaranteed by a federal government program, ending 
borrowers’ ability to discharge any federal loan in bankruptcy court.  Congressional rationale for 
this decision was driven largely by anecdotal evidence that students were filing for bankruptcy 
immediately upon graduating in order to avoid repayment.  A 1976 New York Times article 
documents that approximately 12,000 former students filed bankruptcy claims on $21 million in 
federal loans between 1974 and 1976 compared to only 9,000 bankruptcies occurred on just $17 
million in loans in the previous 15 years.  The lack of stigma felt by those recent graduates filing 
for bankruptcy was exemplified by one student saying, “I do have a sense of responsibility, but 
this bankruptcy thing doesn’t bother me. They were institutions who lost, not people.” At this 
time, federal defaults represented 18%, or $2.2 billion of the $13 billion in outstanding loans. A 
2012 New York Times article highlighted that there were now 5.9 million borrowers in default 
on $76 billion in outstanding loans (Lewin 2012). In 1984, the Bankruptcy Amendments and 
Federal Judgeship Act extended the bankruptcy exclusion from federal to all private student 
loans.  Upon signing the bill, President Ronald Reagan cited the provision in the law that 
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preventing debts incurred as a result of drunk driving from being discharged in bankruptcy, yet 
made no mention of its impact on college students. 
As the federal loan industry developed and grew, budgeting and accounting for student lending 
programs became more problematic.  Under the guarantee model, the U.S. government records 
no direct up-front costs.  Economists worried that the federal government was making long term 
financial commitments without accounting for eventual costs.  In 1990, President George H.W. 
Bush signed the Federal Credit Reform Act.  This law required the U.S. government to begin a 
direct lending program using U.S. Treasury Funds. Figure 5 shows volume trends in the 
government’s direct loan program (New America Foundation 2012).  President Bill Clinton 
expanded this program to provide the same loans to students at a much lower cost to taxpayers.  
As part of the 1993 budget agreement, Congress began to phase in direct lending with a 
provision allowing the Secretary of Education to require colleges to switch to direct loans until at 
least 60% of the market fell under that umbrella.  In 1994, the Republican controlled Congress 
targeted the fledgling direct loan program for elimination. Stopping short of closing the program, 
Congress prohibited the Department of Education from encouraging or requiring colleges to 
switch to direct loans, and as a result, participation in the program fell as institutions returned to 
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Figure 6 shows the relationship between FFELP and Direct Loans over the past two decades. 
Following the decision to phase out the Direct Loan program, the FFELP program continued to 
grow as the main financing vehicle for government-related student loans.  By 2007, new 
origination volume in the Direct loan program reached its lowest point since its creation. 
 






Figure 5: FFELP vs. Direct Loan Volume (1993-2012) 
Figure 5: Direct Loan Share of Federal Volume 
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The trend towards FFEL guarantees reversed with the onset of the financial crisis in late 2007 
and 2008.  The fluctuations in the credit markets threatened the ability of private lenders to 
originate loans under the FFELP banner, and several banks closed their student lending 
businesses.  Colleges began switching back to the Direct Loan program as FFELP guarantees on 
privately originated loans became more difficult to obtain.  In May 2008, Congress passed 
Ensuring Continued Access to Student Loans Act to maintain student borrowers’ access to 
capital.  The Act provided the Department of Education with the ability to purchase or enter into 
forward contracts to purchase FFELP guaranteed loans from the private lenders that originated 
them (Sampson 2008). This meant that the federal government was purchasing loans it 
guaranteed in order to maintain liquidity in the student lending market.  This turned the FFELP 
into a quasi-Direct Loan program, and as a result, made it redundant.   
In 2010, President Obama signed legislation that revamped the federal student lending program.  
The new law ended the FFEL program by eliminating the subsidies paid to banks to act as 
intermediaries for student lending.  This change was projected to save the federal government 
$68 billion over the next decade (Baker & Herszenhorn 2008). Since then, all new loans have 
been made under the Direct Loan program.  
Concurrently, President Obama ended the FFEL program and announced reforms on existing 
debt.  For example, he implemented the income-based repayment plan, in which their annual 
repayments are limited to 10% of their annual income above a basic living allowance (150% of 
the poverty threshold, currently $16,500).  This change is expected to affect over 1.2 million 
borrowers.  Another provision of the President’s reforms include forgiving remaining loan 
balances after 20 years, or 10 years if the student elects to become a public service worker.  
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Luckily for SLABs investors, these provisions only apply to loans originated after 2014, which 
would be fully covered by the Direct Loan Program. 
Currently, two pieces of legislation are under debate in Congress that could affect the student 
lending market.  First, the “Fairness for Struggling Students Act,” introduced by Senator Dick 
Durbin, seeks to repeal the amendment to the bankruptcy code that excludes private student 
loans from being discharged in bankruptcy.  The bill includes a provision that allows borrowers 
who maintained a good faith payment history for a period of years to discharge their debt.  
Second, the “Know Before you Owe Act,” also sponsored by Senator Durbin, would require 
schools to advise students of the risks associated with student debt before they sign on to private 
student loans.  It also requires the school to confirm and approve the necessary loan amount 
before origination (2013). 
Development of the Private Market 
Although private lenders have been involved with student financing since the implementation of 
the 1965 Higher Education Act and the FFELP, their prominence can be attributed to a few key 
events over time. As loan volume grew from 1966 to 1971, private lenders aggregated large 
portfolios of student loans, and due to the extended repayment nature of the product, they began 
to run out of new capital to continue lending.  As a result, Congress created SLM in the 1972 
Amendment to the Higher Education Act.  First, in 1972, is the establishment of the Student 
Loan Marketing Association (SLMA), or Sallie Mae (hereafter referred to as SLM), established a 
vibrant secondary market and warehouse facility for student loans (U.S. Treasury 2006).  
In addition to serving as a liquidity provider for the FFELP, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1981 granted SLM the authority to include non-federally insured loans in its purchase and 
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warehousing programs (General Accounting Office 1984). This provision allowed SLM to 
generate the liquidity necessary for private lenders to originate loans for those borrowers who 
possessed credit profiles that did not qualify for a federal guarantee. 
In 1992 the Securities and Exchange Commission (hereafter SEC) provided further stimulus to 
the private lending market by allowing the non-mortgage ABS to gain a foothold in the capital 
markets by facilitating registered offerings of ABS.  Under the 1992 amendments, offerings of 
investment grade ABS could be shelf-eligible (SEC 2011). Rule 415 of the SEC authorizes 
companies to file a single prospectus, from which they are able to issue additional offerings in 
the future without having to re-file. This allowed private institutions easy access to the capital 
markets in order to raise additional funds for loan origination.   
Securitization of student loans was one of the major factors leading to to the privatization of 
SLM.  In 1995, SLM completed its first ABS transaction, (Sallie Mae Student Loan Trust 1995-1) 
raising $1 billion in the sale of floating rate student-loan backed securities. SLM, surprised at the 
relative ease of accessing the capital markets and of the successful securitization of loans, 
accelerated its desire to become a private entity.  In 1997, SLM shareholders voted to reorganize 
the company, rolling off any remaining GSE debt and replacing it with private debt, which SLM 
did with much success by issuing $120 billion in ABS during the transition phase.  The 
privatization also allowed SLM more freedom to serve the non-guaranteed student loan market 
(U.S. Treasury 2006).  Figure 6 shows the trends in SLM’s methods for student financing from 
its inception to 2004.  The focus on securitization can clearly be seen beginning in 1995-1996, 
followed by a rapid growth in securitized loans while on-balance sheet loan amounts remained 
Private Student Loan Asset Backed Securities: A Default Curve Analysis 
Senior Capstone Project for Nicholas Gentile________________________________________ 
16 
 
stagnant.  Figure 7 shows how the growth in securitized lending was mirrored by the growth 
SLM’s private loan portfolio. 
 
Figure 6: SLM Financing Methods   Figure 7: SLM Private Loan Growth 
Figure 8 shows how the national private lending market grew similar to SLM.  As SLM began its 
transition from a GSE to a private company, the overall market for private, non-federally 
guaranteed was relatively small. A decade later, with the continued development of securitization, 
combined with increasing investor demand for AB paper fueled rapid growth in the private 








Figure 8: National Private Loan Originations (Thomas 2012)  
Private Student Loan Asset Backed Securities: A Default Curve Analysis 
Senior Capstone Project for Nicholas Gentile________________________________________ 
17 
 
Another factor behind the rapid growth of the private lending business was the equally rapid 
ascension in college tuition.  For the ten-year period ending with the 2004-2005 academic year, 
average tuition at public four year colleges increased by 51% (Bartlett 2005). As shown in figure 
9, the rise in tuition prices outpaced medical expenses, CPI and food prices by factors of two, 
four and six respectively.  For context, Bryant University’s tuition was approximately $4,000 in 
1977, which would be nearly $15,000 in 2012 dollars. Bryant tuition in 2012 was $36,000, an 
increase of 900% in 35 years.  Despite the upward trend in college tuition, the federal 
government did not the FFELP loan limit from 1992 to 2008 (CFPB 2012).  This widened the 
gap between federal aid and real tuition costs to widen, leaving room for private lenders to 
develop their market.  
 
Figure 9: Consumer Inflation Trends (Bloomberg) 
The private student loan market developed two loan products: “school certified” and “direct to 
consumer”.  School certified loans are approved by the lender with funds sent directly to the 
school. “Direct-to-consumer” (hereafter DTC) loans are made directly to borrowers.  DTC loans 
allow students to take on debt exceeding the required tuition amount, and possibly spend it on 
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education. Figure 11 shows the percentage of students that maximized their federal borrowing 
ability before turning to the private market (Cunningham & Kienzel 2011).  Lenders operating 
outside the supervision of the educational institution often led borrowers to take out these more 
expensive loans prior to taking out the maximum amount of federal loans that are available to 
them.  In a 2007-2008 study, only 46% of all undergraduate private loan borrowers maximized 
their federal loan amounts.  
 
Figure 10: Utilization of Federal Loan Programs (FICO) 
The push for DTC loans encouraged risky borrowing behavior among new students. Figure 12 
shows the large over-borrowing by students with DTC loans.  According to Moody’s (2009) 
DTC loans lack the safeguards featured by school channel loans that mitigate the risks the 
borrowed funds would be used for purposes other than the original educational intent.  In 2009, 
Moody’s estimated that the expected lifetime default rate for a First Marblehead DTC loan 
would be 2.9 times that of school channel loans.  By 2012, First Marblehead predicted the 
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lifetime default rate on its best quality loans would be 10.4% while the worst quality products, 
largely DTC loans, default 52.3% over their lifetime.  
 
Figure 11: DTC Driven Over-borrowing (CFPB) 
The prevalence of DTC loans declined rapidly following the financial crisis led to a tightening of 
credit standards.  DTC loans comprised 32% of all undergraduate loans in 2008, this number fell 
to 8% in 2009 and were nearly nonexistent by 2011 (CFPB 2012). The proposed “Know Before 
You Owe Act” in Congress, if passed, would prevent the DTC market from ever returning to its 
previous form, which is likely a positive event for borrowers and investors alike. 
FFEL Loan Characteristics 
The FFEL program is comprised of four different types of loans: Stafford, Unsubsidized Stafford, 
PLUS, and Consolidation loans.  The loans have different underwriting and repayment 
characteristics that affect borrower.  Figure 11 shows for the origination volumes by product type 
for 1990-2000. The Unsubsidized Stafford loan volume grew rapidly from its inception to 2000.  
This can be attributed by borrowing from students and families who, while not meeting the 
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income requirements for the subsidized products, still needed assistance in meeting rising college 
tuition payments. 
 
Figure 12: FFELP Product Volumes (1990-2000) (Department of Education) 
The Stafford loan program includes both subsidized and unsubsidized versions.  Subsidized 
Stafford loans are federally guaranteed student loans based on demonstrated financial need.  
During the period in which the borrower is enrolled on at least a part-time basis, or during any 
future deferment periods, the federal government pays the interest on the loan. Unsubsidized 
Stafford loans are federally guaranteed loans that are not based on any demonstrated financial aid 
and interest accrues from the time of disbursement to the school.  The borrower is not required to 
make any interest or principal payments until six months after graduation, which allows the 
interest to be capitalized if the borrower so chooses.  Both these programs have annual 
borrowing limits. Currently, limits for the unsubsidized program are based on the tax status of 
the student (independent or dependent), which is shown in Table 1 (Edvisors 2013). 
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Freshman $3,500 $2,000 $6,000
Sophmore $4,500 $2,000 $6,000
Junior $5,500 $2,000 $7,000
Senior $5,500 $2,000 $7,000  
Table 1: FFELP Loan Limits 
Prior to 1992 the FFEL program was known as the Guaranteed Student Loan (GSL) Program and 
also covered the Supplementary Loans for Students (SLS) Program.  Figure 14 shows how the 
interest rates on these loans have changed over time.  During the 1981-1992 time period interest 
rates on SLS loans were changed annually with various limits (7-9%, 12%, and 14%.)  From 
1988 to 1992, SLS loans carried a fixed rate of 8% which rose to 10% four years after 
origination.  In 1987, variable rate loans were introduced (Finaid 2013).  
 
Figure 13: Stafford Loan Rate History 
The FFELP loan provides borrowers options when encountering difficulty in meeting their 
repayment requirements.  First, the FFELP allows for deferment which releases the borrower 
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from the requirement of paying the principal on their loan.  During this period, the federal 
government continues to make payments on subsidized Stafford loans.  For unsubsidized loans, 
however, the interest accrues, leaving the borrower with the option of either paying the interest, 
or allowing capitalizing it.  The time limits for the deferrment option vary with the borrower’s 
situation  The borrower may defer payments indefinitely so long as they are enrolled in school at 
least half time, pursuing a graduate fellowship, in military service, or in rehabilitation training.  
If the borrower recently returned from active duty, they may defer for up to 13 months, while 
borrowers either unemployed or enduring economic hardship, the deferrment may last 36 months.  
Deferrments are not guaranteed and requests must be approved by the original lender (ISAC 
2010).  Second, the FFELP may suspend payments, known as forebearance.  Forbearance  terms 
are vaguer than those of deferrment with the length of time, and even the ability to do enter 
forbearance entirely up to the discretion of the lender based on borrower circumstances.  
Forbearance is granted in one year increments, with no limit on the number of times the request 
filed or granted. Federal regulations require that the lender certify the reason for the borrower’s 
request and use forbearance as a tool to return delinquent loans to current status or avoid default.  
Forebearance only applies if the  lender believes that the borrower fully intends to eventually 
repay the loan (McGarvey & Nelson 2008).  Some causes that would justify forbearance include 
unforeseen severe health or personal problems, inability to pay within the original window, and 
having monthly payments exceeding 20% of the borrower’s income (Michon 2013).  
Private Loan Characteristics 
The private student loan market is much more diverse than the federal market.  Loan terms, 
interest rates, willingness to offer repayment and modification options vary by lender.  Private 
lenders generally lack the default avoidance and risk mitigation tools provided by federal loan 
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programs (CFPB 2012).  The only common option with federal loans is short-term forbearance, 
which lacks any identifiable guidelines.  Additionally, private lenders do not offer income-based 
repayment options or loan forgiveness. Some lenders have indicated a willingness to develop 
rehabilitation programs that “would satisfy accounting rules and prudential regulators” (Touhey 
et. al. 2012). 
The CFPB Student Loan Ombudsman’s first annual report in 2012 raises many concerns 
regarding the servicing of private student loans, specifically with borrower requests to enter into 
repayment options and loan modification plans that were allegedly offered in the original loan 
terms.  The CFPB attributes these difficulties loan servicing rights that are bought and sold by 
different financial institutions.  The report notes that borrowers note difficulty in enrolling into 
alternative repayment options that were advertised prior to origination.  A common theme in 
borrower complaints is that they were unable to receive clear information regarding their 
repayment options, and even those who were able to get in contact with their servicer were 
generally unsuccessful in obtaining a modification.  The CFPB report also uncovered lenders 
charging a monthly fee to borrowers in forebearance (Kamenshine 2012). It is difficult to 
understand why a servicer would charge an additional fee to someone who was already unable to 
meet their payment requirements. 
A 2012 TransUnion report sheds light on repayment modification.  The report found that 51% of 
student loans were in deferment or forbearance, up from 44% in 2011.  While these figures may 
seem high, it is important to note that they include those borrowers utilizing the in-school 
deferrement option.  Those borrowers have postponed payment on a total of $338 billion in 
outstanding student loans, marking a 70% increase from the prior year.  Breaking down the 
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overall market numbers into federal and private loan varieties reveals the availability, or lack 
thereof, of repayment options in the two markets.  Figure 15 shows forbearance rates for both 
private and federal loans  The deferrment/forbearance rate for federal loan holders was 53% in 
March, compared to 19% of private loan holders (Androitis 2013).  Another driver of the 
discrepancy in deferrment/forbearance rates between the two markets can be the fact that private 
loans are subject to tighter underwriting, such as requiring cosigners, meaning the multitude of 
risk mitigation tools may not be necessary (Nelson 2007).   
 
Figure 14: Private and Federal Loan Forebearance 
Student’s ability to utilize different repayment options to avoid falling behind on payments, 
raises some of the risks for unsubsidized and private loans.  These increasing loan balances due 
to interest capitalization, combined with the inevitable end of the deferment period, exposes 
borrowers to higher debt levels than they started with, which is concerning given the 
unemployment/underemployment rate for recent college graduates under the age of 25 is 53.6%, 
its highest mark in 11 years (InsideARM 2013, Yen 2012).  If the option to defer is unsuccessful, 
the next step is forbearance.   
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Figure 16 shows the results of a 2008 DBRS study that analyzed the quarterly forbearance rates 
of SLABs containing only FFELP loans and found a high correlation between the pool 
forbearance rates and the previous quarter’s unemployment rates, and concluded that investors 
may be likely to forecast future forbearance rates by using quarterly unemployment data (DBRS 
2008).  
 
Figure 15: Forbearance and Unemployment Rates 
 
Figure 16: U.S. Unemployment Rate (BLS 2012) 
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Although figure 17 shows the total unemployment rate for the United States, it is difficult to find 
an accurate depicting the unemployment rate for new college graduates.  The Bureau of Labor 
Statistics reports that college graduates have the lowest unemployment rates in their age group, 
this is due to the fact that the BLS does not take underemployment into account.  The difference 
between those who graduated college and those who only graduated high school is that 
underemployment for a high school graduate would likely only apply to part-time employment; a 
full-time job as a janitor, for example, would be considered in-line with expectations.  A recent 
college graduate resorting to the janitorial trade does not constitute full employment. 
After college borrowers attempt deferment or forbearance options, the next status a student loan 
status is delinquency which begins the first day after a missed payment. The Institute for Higher 
Education Policy (2011) examined delinquency trends for the 2005 student cohort and found that 
26% of borrowers were delinquent at some point during their repayment experience.  Of that 
number, 21% fell into delinquency after using the default avoidance tools of deferment and 
forbearance (Cunningham & Kienzel 2011).  A 2013 FICO report found that the student loan 
delinquency rate from 2010-2012 was 15.1%, up from 12.4% between 2005-2007 (Hamilton).  
As shown in Figure 18, these findings explain how delinquency rates on student loans have 
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Figure 17: Loan Delinquency 
Understanding while student loan defaults are at the center of much of the concern regarding the 
industry, it is important to understand the story behind delinquency rates as it provides a more 
accurate depiction of how many borrowers are having difficulty meeting their repayment 
requirements.  With the default avoidance tools and the extended delinquency window on federal 
loans (270 days vs. 120 days for private loans), the current default picture is not an entirely 
accurate representation, nor does it fully take into account future defaults once delinquent loans 
run out of options (KC Fed 2012).  Even the delinquency rate itself does not provide a true 
understanding of the problems in the market.  When calculating the delinquency rate, the 
delinquency total only includes those borrowers who are behind on their payments while not in a 
default avoidance program, while the total loans outstanding value includes those borrowers.  
Major Players in the Private Loan Market 
Sallie Mae is the largest non-government originator of student loans, but it is not the only 
corporation operating in the space. Figure 19 shows private lending market composition for the 
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2006-2007 year (Student Lending Analytics 2008).  Many of the United States’ largest banking 
institutions originated, at one time or another, both FFELP loans and private student loans. . 
 
Figure 18: 2006-2007 Private Loan Market Share 
Following the financial crisis, several of those lenders either went defunct or withdrew from the 
market.  These institutions were in turn replaced by new entrants including major financial firms 
like Discover Financial Services and Wells Fargo which now rival Sallie Mae in share. 
Sallie Mae began originating private loans in the mid 1990s. Figure 20 shows both the growth in 
its private loan portfolio, as well as the percentage of those loans that were not in repayment. In 
1996 the company introduced the Signature Education Loan Program making loans available to 
students at four-year colleges and universities to make up the difference between the cost of 
attendance and any federal student aid.  The program limited borrowing to the difference 
between the cost of attendance and any other financial aid they received.  SLM Financial, a 
wholly owned subsidiary of Sallie Mae expanded the business’s private loan operations to career 
training, adult learning, and K-12 education, underwriting and pricing these loans according to 
standard consumer credit scoring criteria (SLM Corp. 2000). 
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By 2005, SLM expanded its private lending business through focusing on its direct-to-consumer 
Tuition Answer program that made loans outside of the traditional financial aid process.  The 
Tuition Answer program, started in 2004, utilized direct mail campaigns and web-based 
advertising to target students and parents. Under this program, borrowers could take out a loan 
for between $1,500 and $40,000 for “college-related expenses” without requiring any school 
certification. At this point, only 50% of SLM’s private education loans had co-signers, seemingly 
a dangerous level for the lender, but the increasd risk was reflected in increasing interest income 
as private loans averaged a 4.62% interest margin versus 1.39% for FFELP loans.  
By their 2007, SLM began to witness flaws with its focus on the alternative lending products, yet 
the profitability of the division was still the main story.  The year’s annual report includes the 
following: 
We expect to continue to focus on generally higher-margin Private Education 
Loans, originated both through our school channel and our direct-to-consumer 
channel, with particular attention to upholding our more stringent underwriting 
standards. In January 2008, we notified some of our school customers whosse 
students have non-traditional loans that we were curtailing certain highdefault rate 
lending programs and reviewing the pricing of others. Actual credit performance at 
these programs was materially below our original expectations. 
Despite SLM’s acknowledgement of the products’ risk, the share of private loans made to those 
borrowers with a co-signer only increased from 50% in 2005 to 52% in 2007.  The private 
lending business continued to be quite profitable for the company, as the 5.15% net interest 
margin on those loans generated 36% of the core interest income for the year, despite the fact 
that they only represented 17% of the managed loan portfolio. 
In 2008, SLM realized the serious problem posed by its activities in the private lending market.  
In the beginning of the year, the company announced the end of its non-traiditional lending 
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practice and revised the structure, pricing, underwriting, servicing, collecting, and funding of 
Private Education Loans.  The percentage of private loans with a cosigner increased dramatically 
over the course of the year, from 52% the year before to 74%; reflecting SLM’s discovery that 
having a cosigner decreases default rates by 50%.  Private loans were still very profitable for the 
company with a 5.09% net interest margincompared to 83 basis points for FFELP loans.   
In 2011, SLM further revised its lending procedures for the private market.  The company 
reported that 62% of the private portfolio loans were cosigned and 91% of loans originated in 
2011 were cosigned.  The company did report that previous loan loss provisions for loans that 
defaulted between 2008 and 2011 were not meeting its post-default projections.  SLM makes an 
estimated charge-off for each loan once they become 212 days past due.  The company also 
reported that in 2011, $7.2 billion in loans were currently in interest-only programs, representing 
24% of all loans in repayment.   
In its 2012 full-year earnings release, SLM reported that its fourth quarter profit fell as it 
increased loan loss provisions as a result of the continued, if not increased, inability of student 
borrowers to repay their debt.  The company reported an increase in loan loss provisions of 16% 
over the prior year as it witnessed its net charge off rate rise from 3.52% to 4.19% (Associated 
Press 2013).  Please see figure 18 for SLM’s net private loan portfolio and associated repayment 
behavior over time. 
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Figure 19: SLM Private Loan Portfolio 
Over the last decade, the Student Loan Corporation (hereafter SLC), has been a large originator 
of private student loans. Figure 21 shows SLC’s private portfolio growth over the period.  SLC 
was incorporated in 1992 to manage the student loan business of Citibank N.A., the banking arm 
of the financial services conglomerate Citigroup.  SLC purchased the private loans originated by 
Citibank New York State (CNYS) under the CitiAssist program.  Launched in 1997 CNYS 
private loans are for students who do not qualify for federal aid or need additional funding to 
cover the costs of college education.  The loans are tied to the prime rate with repayment 
characteristics modeled on the FFEL Program.   
 
Figure 20: SLC Private Loan Portfolio 
Private Student Loan Asset Backed Securities: A Default Curve Analysis 
Senior Capstone Project for Nicholas Gentile________________________________________ 
32 
 
For much of the 2000s, CitiAssist loans were generally originated in a conservative manner.  
Primarily school-channel based, the lending amounts revolved around certification from the 
school’s financial aid advisor.  During the financial crisis, SLC reported minimal credit 
deterioration to its private loan portfolio, citing only slight rises in delinquency and forbearance 
rates. The crisis, however, did force the company to cease private consolidation loan operations 
in October of 2008. 
In 2009, SLC revised its private loan servicing procedures.  The company outlined changes 
involving borrowers with payment difficulties facing stricter performance criteria to be granted 
forbearance or deferment.  The company noted expected these changes would materially increase 
losses from private loans.  Similarly to Sallie Mae, SLC began an interest-only repayment option 
which was utilized by 19% of private loan borrowers.  
At the time, SLC was the third largest originator of private loans (shown in Figure 22) but in late 
2010, SLC announced liquidation of its assets that would shift the private loan market 
composition.  Sallie Mae purchased $28 billion of SLC’s federal loans and related assets, 
Citibank purchased $8.7 billion in both federal and private student loans, and Discover Financial 
Services purchased $4.2 billion in private student loans that included 74% cosigned loans, 65% 
loans in repayment, and 70% insured loans (McIntyre 2010).  With the acquisition, Discover 
became a top originator of private student loans (Discover 2010). 
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Figure 21: 2009 Private Loan Market Shares 
Discover was a relatively late entrant to the private lending market, beginning their program in 
2007.  The goal of the program was to establish variable rate Certified Private Loans for families 
and students with zero origination and prepayment fees with spreads ranging from 50 – 625 basis 
points based on credit criteria (Methodist University).  
Discover encouraged reponsible borrowering by requiring school certification and directly 
disbusing loans to the institution.  The loans featured various timely repayment and education 
incentives including a cash reward at graduation equal to 2% of the outstanding loan balance.   
In 2010, Discover announced that it was selling any federally guaranteed loans it held in its 
portfolio in order to focus on the newly acquired assets from SLC which quadrupled the size of 
its private loan holdings, as shown in Figure 23. In 2011, Discover purchased an additional $2.5 
billion in private loans from Citibank despite the  the possibility of repealing the private student 
loan exclusion from bankruptcy They claim this is not a material concern, however, since their 
underwriting practices and percentage of loans with cosigners mitigates any risk to the business   
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Figure 22: Discover Private Loan Portfolio 
KeyCorp is yet another player in the private loan space.  Figure 24 shows their student lending 
portfolio for the period they were involved in the business. KeyCorp makes very little mention of 
its student lending business in its annual reports, aside from providing the total amount of 
education loans it services or administers. 
 
Figure 23:KeyCorp Student Loan Portfolio (Barclays) 
KeyCorp prospectuses for its securitized loan trusts offer the most insight into it student lending 
business.  In the mid-1990s, KeyCorp purchased student loans originated by The Access Group, 
a nonprofit entity that was a leader in providing loans for law students.  Access Group was 
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founded in 1983 to provide both federal and private student loans. In 1993, they created a spinoff, 
Law Access Inc., to handle the private loans that expanded beyond loans to law students. 
KeyCorp purchased the Access Group loans, insured them against default with TERI, and 
packaged them into securities for sale.  TERI guaranteed the total principal amount in the event 
of a borrower default (no payment for 120 days), a borrower bankruptcy, the death of the 
borrower, or the total and permanent disability of the borrower.  All of the private loans in the 
1996 securitization were insured. 
By 2000, KeyCorp securitizations began to include a substantial amount of unguaranteed private 
loans (31.69% of total private), driven mainly by the Key Alternative Loan Program.  The 
Alternative Loan Program was introduced in 1995 as another tool for students to use to finance 
their education with similar terms as the other private loans originated by the Access Group and 
guaranteed by TERI.  The prospectus does not mention the reason for KeyCorp not choosing to 
insure these loans against default.  
KeyCorp issued its last securitization in 2006 in a trust featuring a group of private loans that 
were nearly all unguaranteed (98.98%). The unguaranteed private loans included loans from the 
Key Alternative Loan Program, Campus Door Loans, Key CareerLoans, Private Graduate Loans, 
and Achiever Loans (K-12).  The financial crisis led KeyCorp to announce it would limit new 
education loans to government backed programs, thereby eliminating itself from the private 
lending market. KeyCorp attributed this plan to management’s decision to “deemphasize their 
out-of-footprint businesses.” Shortly after announcing the switch to an entirely federally-backed 
education lending model in September of 2009, KeyCorp announced that it was discontinuing 
education lending. 
Private Student Loan Asset Backed Securities: A Default Curve Analysis 
Senior Capstone Project for Nicholas Gentile________________________________________ 
36 
 
The biggest player in the private lending market was First Marblehead (hereafter FMD).  FMD’s 
main business objective, prior to its restructuring in late 2009-2010, was to provide services for 
private education lending in the United States.  FMD did not originate, guarantee, or service 
loans, but rather collected fees from processing and securitizing third party loans. In addition to 
the securitization process, FMD also assisted lenders with underwriting, documentation and 
disbursement, and customer support. Figure 25 provides information on  FMD’s private lender 
clients’ two major business lines: “make and sell” and “make and hold.” The former grouping 
referred to those lenders that securitized and sold its originated student loans and the latter 
referring to those institutions which retained the loans on their balance sheets.   
 
Figure 24: FMD Client Business Lines 
The shift towards the securitization model shown in Figure 25 was greatly beneficial to FMD 
(representing 78% of revenue for FY 2007).  This focus on securitization reflected a key 
provision in the First Marblehead approach, which reads: “Using our services, our clients can 
offer student borrowers access to customized, competitive student loan products while enhancing 
their fees but minimizing their resource commitment and exposure to credit risk.”  For FMD’s 
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clients, securitization offered the opportunity to increase loan volume and fees, without keeping 
any “skin-in-the-game” as far as risk retention goes. 
FMD’s role in the securitization process was to establish the bankruptcy remote special purpose 
entities that would house the purchased (which in some cases were sourced, processed, and 
underwritten by FMD) and assist with the bond issues.  In return, FMD earned advisory and 
administrative fees, as well as a residual interest payment from the securitization.  By 2004, 
FMD structured and facilitated 22 private student loan securitizations.  And this number rose to 
36 securitizations by 2007. In 2006 alone, the trusts that FMD created and advised would have 
been, combined, the fourth largest issuer of SLABs.  
In addition to its securitization business, FMD’s strategic alliance with TERI allowed it to 
become such an integral part of the private student lending market. In 2001, FMD entered into a 
relationship with TERI with the goal of enhancing the company’s risk management and loan 
processing abilities.  The alliance was a partial acquisition of TERI, resulting in FMD purchasing 
its historical database and loan processing operations, along with 161 TERI employees in 
exchange for $7.9 million in promissory notes, $1 million in cash, and a 25% share on all future 
TERI-guaranteed FMD-facilitated securitizations.   
The TERI-FMD alliance resulted in the creation of a master servicing agreement in which TERI 
sub-contracted FMD to provide origination, pre-claims, claims, and default management services 
for TERI’s client lenders.  In addition to the servicing agreement, the entities also entered into a 
master guaranty agreement in which TERI possessed the right of first refusal to guarantee 
FMD’s clients’ current and future loan programs.  FMD also agreed to create a market for its 
clients to sell TERI-guaranteed loans through FMD-facilitated securitizations. Under this 
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agreement, FMD was required, to the best of its abilities, to generate securitizations of TERI-
guaranteed loans twice per year. 
Shortly after FMD filed its 2007 10-k report, business deteriorated due to the credit market issues 
that developed in the latter half of 2007 and into 2008, FMD was unable to issue any new 
securitizations.  This issue was made worse in April 2008 when TERI filed for voluntary 
bankruptcy, citing liquidity problems caused by credit market volatility and increased borrower 
defaults/delinquencies (Business Wire 2008). The TERI bankruptcy became a bigger issue for 
FMD than the constricted debt markets.  FMD generated much of their business from TERI-
sourced client relationships.  As a result of the bankruptcy filing, three major lenders (Bank of 
America, Royal Bank of Scotland, and J.P. Morgan Chase) terminated their relationships with 
FMD.  These three lenders generated 56% of FMD’s loans available for securitization in 2008.  
As a result of being shut out of the securitization market, FMD resorted to changing its entire 
business model during 2009 and 2010.  FMD began to focus more on fee-for-service offerings 
like portfolio management and asset servicing.  The company also introduced “Monogram,” a 
program that incorporates refinements to the company’s origination process.  As of 2010, FMD 
began originating loans under the Monogram program in agreement with SunTrust Bank.  FMD 
designed the Monogram focus to distance the company from the capital markets and make it less 
dependent on the securitization market.  Without TERI, FMD has used the Monogram program 
to fund various credit enhancement efforts on the portfolios. As of its 2012 10-k, FMD had 
gotten its Monogram program fully functional; originating its own education loans through its 
banking subsidiary, Union Federal Bank.   
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The successes and failures of the institutions involved in the private loan market revolve heavily 
on the practice of securitization.  First Marblehead evidenced how the securitization process, 
when functioning as intended, can be a great boon to business, but in the event the system breaks 
down, it can cripple a business’s lending operation.   
Section III: Data 
The data includes student loan trusts originated between 2001 and 2007 packaged by KeyCorp 
and Sallie Mae. Table 2 provides complete trust names and identifiers. The Sallie Mae Trusts are 
comprised of private student loans, while the KeyCorp securitizations contain both federal and 
private loans.  The KeyCorp securitizations are tranched into several groups of public and private 
loans, however, we focus on the Group II of each trust which contain only private loans.  In total, 
the sixteen private loan trusts represent a total principal amount of $20.885 billion, representing 
approximately 25% of the private loan market for the period.  The monthly trust performance 
data start from origination through August 2012. The data includes 428 individual records of 
cumulative defaults for the respective trusts. 
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SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2002-A 1
SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2003-A 2
SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2003-B 3
SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2003-C 4
SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2004-A 5
SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2004-B 6
SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2005-A 7
SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2005-B 8
SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2006-A 9
SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2006-B 10
SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2006-C 11
SLM Private Credit Student Loan Trust 2007-A 12
KeyCorp Student Loan Trust 2001-A 13
KeyCorp Student Loan Trust 2002-A 14
KeyCorp Student Loan Trust 2003-A 15
KeyCorp Student Loan Trust 2004-A 16  
Table 2: Trust Names and Identifiers 
The student loan trust prospectuses contain a variety of information regarding loan type, and 
borrower characteristics that can be used as tools in investigating the cumulative default patterns.  
Table 3 provides borrower specific information.  The number of borrowers in each trust ranges 
from 29,157 to 166,394, averaging 95,121.  The Sallie Mae trusts are considerably larger than 
the KeyCorp issuances and both issuers grew the size of their securitizations over time. The 
average principal amount outstanding per borrower ranges from $10,999 to $17,971, averaging 
$13,138.19.  The Sallie Mae securitizations generally had the same average loan amount per 
borrower, while KeyCorp’s average principal grew by 26% in the span of 4 years.  The Sallie 
Mae prospectuses also provide information regarding borrower credit worthiness.  The average 
FICO score for borrowers at origination ranges from 714 to 736, averaging 719.  At issuance, 
these scores declined, ranging from 696 to 712 and averaging 706.  This decline can be attributed 
to borrowers who had no credit score at origination but developed a credit history as they began 
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repayment.  Loans were also made to borrowers with sub-prime credit or nonexistent credit 
scores.  At origination, these loans made up 0.7% to 38.7% of the total principal, averaging 
13.4%.  These percentages generally declined over the period as the issuers began to require 
more co-signers to mitigate credit risks.  At issuance, the share of sub-prime or no credit history 
borrowers ranges from 6.9% to 13%.  These values are more representative of the overall credit-



















1 48,548       14,220$         718                 14.90% 703             13.00%
2 77,197       13,021$         715                 33.40% 710             10.10%
3 103,358     12,068$         719                 24.60% 712             6.92%
4 91,587       13,648$         736                 16.20% 712             9.70%
5 104,834     11,944$         716                 38.70% 696             10.10%
6 109,001     11,767$         720                 8.00% 703             8.80%
7 132,087     11,394$         717                 5.40% 701             9.80%
8 128,332     11,690$         721                 2.90% 710             8.70%
9 165,026     12,121$         719                 1.90% 707             9.60%
10 166,394     12,016$         718                 11.10% 708             7.20%
11 98,962       10,999$         714                 3.50% 700             12.20%
12 153,654     13,020$         718                 0.70% 710             7.80%
13 29,157       14,250$         . . . .
14 41,174       15,151$         . . . .
15 33,575       16,542$         . . . .
16 39,057       17,971$         . . . .  
Table 3: Borrower Characteristics 
Table 4 provides loan status as a share of total trust principal.  The prospectuses break down the 
loans into five main groups: in-school, grace, deferment, forbearance, and repayment. The loan 
status mix is fairly different between issuers.  Sallie Mae securitizations feature anywhere from 
44.5% to 85.4% of in-school loans, averaging 60.18%.  On the other hand, in-school loans for 
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KeyCorp issuances range from 4.09% to 21.25%, averaging 10.37%.  This difference means that 
the repayment performance of a majority of Sallie Mae loans was unknown at the time of 
issuance as borrowers had yet to enter the repayment period, while a vast majority of KeyCorp 
loans were already out of school and facing repayment.  The trusts also featured varying amounts 
of loans in the grace period (6 months following graduation).  The Sallie Mae issuances range 
from 7.3% to 44.1% of principal in the grace status, averaging 15.4%.  KeyCorp issued trusts 
with considerably more loans in the grace period, ranging from 33.89% to 48.91% and averaging 
43.85%.  This difference means that, at issuance, a large portion of KeyCorp borrowers were 
fresh out of school and nearing the repayment period.   
Identifer   In School   Grace   Deferred   Forbearance   Repayment
1 16.60% 44.10% 1.60% 2.70% 35.00%
2 47.40% 7.30% 0.10% 4.60% 40.60%
3 61.30% 7.30% 0.00% 2.40% 29.00%
4 51.40% 23.00% 0.10% 4.20% 21.30%
5 44.50% 13.50% 2.30% 9.10% 30.60%
6 85.40% 7.70% 1.00% 1.20% 4.70%
7 71.40% 12.30% 1.30% 1.70% 13.30%
8 68.20% 19.80% 1.10% 1.70% 9.20%
9 77.60% 8.40% 1.00% 2.20% 10.80%
10 65.90% 13.60% 0.80% 3.20% 16.50%
11 61.40% 19.90% 1.30% 3.50% 13.90%
12 71.10% 8.00% 1.10% 2.40% 17.40%
13 4.09% 48.91% 2.69% 6.47% 37.84%
14 7.51% 33.89% 19.33% 3.44% 35.83%
15 8.63% 46.75% 14.59% 0.40% 29.63%
16 21.25% 44.26% 12.08% 0.20% 22.21%  
Table 4: Loan Status as a Percent of Total Principal 
Table 5 provides percentages of principal by loan type.  The prospectuses break down loan type 
into five main groups: four-year undergrad and liberal arts graduate loans, 2-year undergraduate 
loans, law school loans, MBA loans, and medical school loans.  The first group comprises 
Private Student Loan Asset Backed Securities: A Default Curve Analysis 
Senior Capstone Project for Nicholas Gentile________________________________________ 
43 
 
majority of the principal in the trusts, ranging from 46.6% to 86.7% and averaging 69.1% across 
the issuers.  Two-year loans, regarded as the riskiest student product, ranges from 0% to 28.5% 
and averages 6.1%.  Sallie Mae kept their 2-year loans to a minimum for most of the period 
(averaging 2.47% for trusts 1-11), but this value jumped to 28.5% for trust 12, a noticeable 
increase in risk profile for the entire trust.  KeyCorp, while featuring high percentages (averaging 
10.94%), kept their loan profile fairly consistent.  Law loans, while initially a sizeable portion of 
the trusts, fell out of favor as the years went on, ranging from 3.5% of total principal to 22.1%, 
averaging 11%.  The same story is true for Sallie Mae regarding MBA and medical loans. The 
share of MBA loans ranges from 0.8% (KeyCorp didn’t issue this type of loan) to 15.3%, 
averaging 4.2%.  Medical loans make up between 1.4% and 18% of the trusts, averaging 7%.  
For Sallie Mae, these loans became a marginal product in the later securitizations, while 
KeyCorp medical loans averaged 13% of the total trust principal over the period. 
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  Undergrad 
Loans
  2-Year 
Loans
  Law 
Loans
  MBA 
Loans
  Medical 
Loans
1 47.70% 1.80% 20.20% 15.30% 14.90%
2 66.40% 1.30% 22.10% 4.90% 5.10%
3 73.20% 3.00% 14.30% 4.50% 5.00%
4 68.00% 3.60% 15.20% 10.20% 2.90%
5 67.90% 4.10% 13.20% 4.70% 10.00%
6 77.50% 2.30% 7.40% 6.70% 5.90%
7 81.60% 4.90% 5.90% 4.50% 3.10%
8 86.70% 0.30% 6.10% 4.30% 2.60%
9 86.50% 0.50% 5.90% 5.00% 2.20%
10 82.40% 2.90% 9.80% 2.20% 2.60%
11 81.60% 2.50% 6.50% 3.30% 5.00%
12 46.60% 28.50% 3.50% 0.80% 1.40%
13 56.00% 0.00% 22.00% 0.00% 18.00%
14 61.00% 12.77% 7.00% 0.00% 12.00%
15 57.00% 17.00% 9.00% 0.00% 11.00%
16 63.00% 14.00% 7.00% 0.00% 11.00%  
Table 5: Loan Type as a Percent of Total Principal 
Section IV: Empirical Results 
Univariate Tests 
The central focus of this research is to determine if the mean cumulative default values are 
significantly statistically different between the trusts and if they have changed over time.  Figure 
x shows the raw cumulative default values for the trusts in the study and appear to have different 
shapes and slopes.  The KeyCorp trusts (13-16) differ from the Sallie Mae trusts (1-12) with 
default curves indicating a higher rate of credit deterioration than the Sallie Mae trusts. The 
numbers associated with the trusts in Figure x are based on vintage, i.e., Trust 1 is the oldest 
Sallie Mae issuance and Trust 13 is the oldest KeyCorp issuance.  The older vintages have longer 
performance issuance information. 
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Figure 25: Cumulative Default by Period 
Figure 25 suggests that there may be difference across issuers and time when examining turst 
performance.  Normally, the T-Test is used to test the difference in groups, as there are only two 
issuers in the study, but further tests would involve multiple groups.  Also, T-Tests rely on 
assumptions that are violated by the type of data in this study; namely the variance in means 
across groups.  For those reasons, the statistical testing method will feature the ANOVA test. 
The null hypothesis of the one-way ANOVA is that the means of the groups are equal.  The 
alternative hypothesis is that at least two of the group means are significantly different.  The one-
way ANOVA carries numerous assumptions, one of which is variance equality.  This is a key 
issue with respect to the data in the study.  The cumulative defaults for the trusts are time-series 
values.  The variance of the mean increases as the trust ages, meaning, the variances within this 
data set are unequal, effectively violating one of the assumptions of the One-way ANOVA test.  
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The unequal variance issue is exacerbated by the unequal sample sizes of the trusts.  As some 
trusts were naturally originated at an earlier date than others, they have more record periods.  The 
combination of these two factors would leave any One-way ANOVA result suspect at best, as the 
p-values would be too conservative or liberal for any conclusion to be reached with confidence. 
Fortunately, the One-way ANOVA is robust with respect to the homogeneity of variance 
assumption.  If a statistical test is robust, it means that the output is minimally affected by a 
violation of that assumption.  The prerequisite for the ANOVA “robustness” is that the group 
sizes need to be more or less equal (Northern Arizona University).  The record periods for the 
trusts range from a high of 40 to a low of 8.  In order to get the One-way ANOVA to work, the 
sample size of the largest group must be no more than 1 ½ times that of the smallest group.  As 
such, only 12 records were included from 15 of the trusts, with the last trust providing 8.  The 
study now is testing whether or not the cumulative default rates on the trusts were statistically 
different within the first 2-3 years following origination.   
Figure 26 shows the difference in cumulative default rates by issuer which appear vastly 
different.  Statistically, the difference in mean default rates, by seasoning, for the issuers 
generated an F-statistic of 156.85, which at 187 degrees of freedom, resulted in a probability > F 
of 0.000 meaning that the null hypothesis of mean equality can be rejected.  Thus, the KeyCorp 
trusts do perform worse than their Sallie Mae counterparts.   
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Figure 256: Cumulative Default by Issuer 
Given the significant differences in default curves, the next question is to find if the results are 
impacted by cohort year. The cohort years were constructed as dummy variables for analysis, 
and the univariate tests reveal some years were significant while others were not.  All cohort 
years for each issuer are shown in figures 27 and 28 below for comparison purposes.  Both 
figures reveal the trend indicated by the original depiction, that is, trusts issued later on in the 
observation period performed worse than their peers.  This is evidence that the trusts were either 
constructed differently as the years went on, or they were exposed to different repayment 
environments early in their lifecycle. 
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Figure 27: Cumulative Default by Cohort Year (KeyCorp) 
 
Figure 28: Cumulative Default by Cohort Year (Sallie Mae) 
     
Having established that the cumulative default rates are statistically different by issuer and 
cohort year, the next step is to determine if the trusts are significantly different from each other 
across issuer and cohort year.  First, the one-way ANOVA test determined that the trusts are 
significantly different from each other with an F-statistic of 6.83 and a p-value of 0.000.  Figure 
29 and 30 show the cumulative default curve by trust for each issuer. These charts reveal trends 
that are consistent with the original picture.  The KeyCorp chart reveals that later vintage trusts 
did perform worse than earlier vintage issuances. The Sallie Mae chart, while less clear, shows 
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the same trend.  The last three trusts in the Sallie Mae group performed the worst, while all the 
other issuances were more or less had similar curves.  This level of analysis shows that the make-
up of the trusts are significantly different enough to cause changes in the cumulative default 
patterns. 
 
Figure 29: Cumulative Default by Trust (KeyCorp) 
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Figure 30: Cumulative Default by Trust (Sallie Mae) 
Given the variation in cumulative default trends for the trusts, the next question is whether these 
differences are due to borrower characteristics of the trusts.  
Figure 31 and 32 provides the relationship between percentage of loans in 2 or 4 year programs 
and cumulative default rates for Sallie Mae.  For illustrative purposes, the charts depict the 
default curves for the trusts with the highest and lowest percentage of loans in each program type.  
For undergrad programs, Trust 8 has the highest percentage of principal in undergrad loans 
(86.7%) and Trust 12 has the lowest percentage (46.6%).  Trust 7 has the highest percentage of 
principal in two-year loans (4.7%) while Trust 8 has the lowest (0.3%).  The two-year program 
trend is the most important feature to highlight.  Two-year programs are mostly held at for-profit 
educational institutions that have been in the spotlight for encouraging heavy student borrowing 
in order to make the tuition payments that drive bottom line profitability.  These institutions are 
not likely to give out any sort of scholarship or subsidized aid packages, and as a result, students 
Private Student Loan Asset Backed Securities: A Default Curve Analysis 
Senior Capstone Project for Nicholas Gentile________________________________________ 
51 
 
are left to borrow the full cost of tuition, which in some cases rivals that of well-regarded four-
year colleges.  Students graduating from these programs (which is hardly guaranteed) may not 
end up being employed at a position that pays a salary suitable for repaying the loans. 
 
Figure 31: Cumulative Default by % Undergrad Loans 
 
Figure 32: Cumulative Default by % 2-Yr Loans 
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Figures 33 and 34 show the relationship between loan status and cumulative defaults for Sallie 
Mae trusts.  The initial credit quality of the loan pools may also be captured by the percentage of 
loans in forbearance when the trusts are formed. Trusts with higher percentages typically have 
higher cumulative default rates than those trusts with the lowest percentages.  Trust 5 features the 
greatest percentage of loans in forbearance at issuance (9.1%) while Trust 6 has the lowest 
amount (1.2%).  This trend is less clear for the deferment option due to the Sallie Mae trusts all 
having similar starting values for the percent of loans in deferment.  Trust 5 has the highest 
percentage of loans in deferment (2.3%) and Trust 3 has the lowest (0%). 
 
Figure 33: Cumulative Default by % Loans in Forbearance 
Private Student Loan Asset Backed Securities: A Default Curve Analysis 




Figure 34: Cumulative Default by % Loans in Deferment 
 
SLAB investors, like most fixed income investors, rely on the FICO when examining these pools.  
The average FICO scores at origination can also provide clues as to how the trusts will perform.  
Figure 35 shows the relationship between origination FICO scores and cumulative default rates.  
The chart shows that there is a sizeable difference in cumulative default rates at the end of three 
years for the trust with the highest average FICO score at origination (Trust 4, 736) and the trust 
with the lowest (Trust 11, 714).  While these values do not take into account loans that featured 
borrowers without a credit score, it does provide some insight to the general credit quality of the 
borrowers in the trust. 
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Figure 35: Cumulative Default by Origination FICO 
 
While a trust’s default behavior is caused by varying internal aspects due to underwriting, these 
factors cannot entirely explain the performance history. External economic conditions may also 
impact borrower repayment.  The internal trust dynamics influence how each issue performs in 
the external environment.   Table 6 provides the minimums and maximums for selected 
economic variables which varied dramatically over the performance horizon.  For example, the 
range of GDP growth over the period exceeds 15%.  The 90-day treasury bill, an integral factor 
for floating rate products like student loans, fell from a high of 5% to essentially zero in 
approximately a year.  The unemployment rate, normally 5-6% in normal economic conditions, 
jumped to nearly 10% during the recession.  This unemployment number does not account for 
unemployment, which is an important issue relating to new college graduates and debt 
repayment.   
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GDP Growth -8.90% 6.70%
CPI Change YoY -1.50% 5.40%
90 Day T-Bill 0.00% 5.00%  
Table 6: Economic Variables 
Figure 36 provides the relationship between the national unemployment rate and the cumulative 
default rate for the Sallie Mae securities.  Cumulative defaults appear to increase with the 
unemployment rate which is not a groundbreaking discovery, although, the trusts appear to be 
fairly resilient to mild to moderate unemployment.  The rapid climb in defaults occurred right as 
the nation crossed the 6.5% unemployment level. Figure 37 paints a clearer picture of the 
cumulative default-unemployment relationship. As soon as the unemployment rate in the period 
was 1% higher than it was at origination, cumulative defaults began to rise dramatically.  Both 
these charts illustrate how weak the trusts were in the face of deteriorating employment 
conditions.  In a high-unemployment scenario, companies are less likely to hire inexperienced 
college graduates who were likely expecting full employment following their graduation.  
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Figure 36: Cumulative Default by Unemployment 
 
Figure 37: Cumulative Default by Change in Unemployment 
Change in the Consumer Price Index is another economic variable that can affect repayment 
behavior.  Figure 38 shows the relationship of yearly CPI changes and cumulative default rates 
for each issuer.  If one assumes the high defaults under the deflationary events were crisis-related, 
then the general trend is that cumulative defaults rise along with prices.  If a college graduate 
Private Student Loan Asset Backed Securities: A Default Curve Analysis 
Senior Capstone Project for Nicholas Gentile________________________________________ 
57 
 
was living on a tight budget, then any gradual change upwards in prices, not accompanied by an 
increase in wages, would increase the likelihood that their income would become insufficient for 
repayment purposes. 
 
Figure 38: Cumulative Default by CPI Change 
One last economic variable that could affect repayment behavior is the prevailing interest rate 
environment.  As many of the loans within the trust were priced on a variable rate basis, as the 
benchmark rate (trusts featured 90-Day T-bill, Prime Rate, 3 Mo. LIBOR) changed, so would the 
repayment amount that each borrower owed.  One of the common basis rates for these trusts is 
the 90-Day Treasury Bill. Figure 39 shows the 90-day T-Bill rate for 2001-2012.  Over the 
observation period, this rate changed dramatically, and repayment behavior depends both on 
what point of the curve the trust was originated and the subsequent trend.  Figure 40 provides the 
relationship between defaults and 90-day rate for each period.  Figure 41 illustrates how defaults 
behaved relative to changes in the floating rate from the time of origination.  In Figure 40, the 
KeyCorp trusts show the strong positive relationship between the prevailing rate and cumulative 
Private Student Loan Asset Backed Securities: A Default Curve Analysis 
Senior Capstone Project for Nicholas Gentile________________________________________ 
58 
 
defaults, while Sallie Mae shows less of a trend, likely attributable collapse in rates as a result of 
the crisis.  Figure 41 provides a clearer relationship for both issuers: as rates increased from 
where the spreads were set, defaults increased accordingly. If a loan was originated when the 
prevailing rate was relatively low, it would likely carry a higher spread to generate the required 
net interest income for the issuing entity.  If rates moved upward, the borrower would experience 
a sizeable rise in their payments.  On the other hand, if the loan was originated in a high rate 
environment, it would likely carry a comparatively lower spread which would benefit the 
borrower in the event of falling rates.   
 
Figure 39: 90-day T-Bill Rate 
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Figure 40: Cumulative Default by 90-day T-Bill 
 
Figure 41: Cumulative Default by Change in T-Bill Since Origination 
Multivariate Models 
Given the trends evident in the univariate tests, we now move towards constructing the 
multivariate model that best explains the trust cumulative defaults.  Our hypothesis is that the 
defaults are driven by several factors: issuer, cohort year, macroeconomic variables and 
underwriting/borrower characteristic variables.  We progressively built the model; running it as 
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we added a new grouping of variables.  This approach allowed for a clearer understanding of 
how each grouping of variables affected their defaults. 
To start, the initial model consists of the issuer dummy variable (key) and the cohort variables.  
The earliest cohort, 2001, was omitted.  Table 7 provides the results for this model run.  The 
included variables were all significant at the 95% confidence level with logical coefficient 
directions.  The model indicates that there is a significant difference between issuers, with 
KeyCorp trusts performing worse than their Sallie Mae counterparts.  For the cohort variables, 
the deterioration in performance relative to the omitted cohort generally increases with the newer 
trusts.  The model is consistent with the hypothesis and has an R2 value of 0.5052. 
Robust
cum_def Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
Issuer
key  0.03571 0.002142 16.68 0 .0315131    .0399076
Cohort Year
2002 0.015192 0.002142 7.09 0 .0109951    .0193895
2003 0.016932 0.001797 9.42 0 .013409    .0204546
2004 0.013687 0.002811 4.87 0 .0081781    .0191963
2005 0.014039 0.002354 5.96 0 .0094251    .0186529
2006 0.018664 0.003232 5.78 0 .0123297    .0249977
2007 0.022757 0.002142 10.63 0 .0185592    .0269537
Constant
constant 0.007762 0.002142 -3.62 0 .0119595   -.0035651  
Table 7: Model Run #1 
Given the impact of the issuer and cohort variables, the next step is to add in some economic 
variables that we believe should impact defaults given the results of the univariate tests.  In 
addition to those variables, we also included the seasoning variable (obs) to control for the 
natural increase in cumulative defaults over time.  Table 8 provides the results for this model run.  
The model has an R2 value of 0.8543. The added variables are significant at the 95% level and 
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possess logical coefficients.  The addition of the macroeconomic and seasoning variables also 
strengthened both the significance and the impact of the issuer and cohort variables.  The 
macroeconomic variables show that cumulative defaults increase as the 90-day Treasury bill rate 
increases from the point of origination as well as when unemployment increases.  Naturally, the 
seasoning variable indicates that cumulative defaults increase with time. 
This model omits economic variables that we initially deemed important, but turned out to be 
insignificant in determining defaults.  We are surprised that the change in unemployment relative 
to the origination date is insignificant.  We assumed that if the loan was originated in good 
economic times, then the borrower and originator alike could express greater confidence in the 
borrower’s ability to gain employment after graduation, resulting in a loosening of standards.  
Also, the yearly change in the consumer price index and change relative to the origination point 
are also insignificant.  Due to the general stagnation of wages seen in this country, we assumed 










Table 2: Model Run #2 
 Robust
cum_def  Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
Issuer
key  0.037219 0.001195 31.15 0 .034877    .0395609
Cohort Year
2002 0.015016 0.001393 10.78 0 .0122866    .0177454
2003 0.014847 0.002172 6.84 0 .0105903    .0191039
2004 0.013723 0.002437 5.63 0 .0089462    .0184991
2005 0.017058 0.00154 11.07 0 .0140395    .0200773
2006 0.023866 0.003166 7.54 0 .0176603    .0300716
2007 0.025113 0.002797 8.98 0 .0196313    .0305949
Macroeconomic
change_tbill  0.214625 0.106201 2.02 0.043 .0064758     .422774
unemployment  0.404332 0.128083 3.16 0.002 .153295    .6553691
Seasoning
obs  0.002938 0.000516 5.7 0 .0019269    .0039482
Constant
constant 0.050396 0.005913 -8.52 0 .0619858   -.0388057
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Given the results of the previous model runs, the next and final step is to include the 
underwriting/borrower characteristic variables.  Table 8 provides the results of this model run 
which generates an R2 of 0.8635. The significant variables included ones relating to the status of 
the loans, the degree program associated with the loans, and the weighted average rate of the 
loans.  The results for the forbearance variable indicate the trusts perform worse as the 
percentage of loans in forbearance increases.  The variable controlling for loans made for two-
year programs tells the same story.  The variable controlling for loans made to borrowers in four 
year undergrad programs or liberal arts graduate programs is also consistent with our prior 
reasoning.  These loans made to more conventional students are safer than those made to 
students in what can be considered alternative two year programs.  One variable with a surprising, 
yet significant, coefficient is the one controlling for the percentage of loans in deferment.  The 
model indicates that as the percentage of these loans increases, cumulative defaults decrease.  It 
is possible that the lenders’ default-avoidance programs are more effective for those borrowers in 
deferment than those in forbearance.  Lastly, as one can assume, as the weighted average rate of 
the trust’s borrowers increases, defaults increase accordingly.  The inclusion of the borrower 
characteristic/underwriting variables impacted both the significance and coefficients of the 
variables from the prior model runs.  The change in Treasury bill variable is now significant only 
at the 90% level.  Also, the cohort variables’ significance and magnitude is also modified by the 
inclusion of these new variables.  This could mean that the borrower characteristic/underwriting 
variables play a larger role in cumulative defaults than the cohort years.  Also, the cohort year 
variables may previously have been including a general decrease in credit quality throughout the 
industry during the previous model runs. 
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This model run omits the results for underwriting variables that we initially deemed important, 
but turned out to be insignificant in determining defaults.  We were especially surprised that the 
weighted average loan term and average loan amount per borrower were deemed insignificant.  
We assumed that a longer term would mean a shorter observational period to determine borrower 
repayment behavior and would signify a greater likelihood of a fast-paced “originate to 
securitize” model on behalf of the issuers.  We also assumed that if borrowers averaged larger 
















Table 3: Model Run #3 
Robust
cum_def Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf Interval]
Issuer
key 0.039023 0.006255 6.24 0 0.026763 0.051283
Cohort Year
2002 0.02101 0.006031 3.48 0 0.00919 0.03283
2003 0.024695 0.005813 4.25 0 0.013301 0.036088
2004 0.024089 0.00567 4.25 0 0.012976 0.035202
2005 0.016341 0.00605 2.7 0.007 0.004483 0.028199
2006 0.010383 0.006832 1.52 0.129 -0.00301 0.023774
2007 -0.02251 0.010889 -2.07 0.039 -0.04386 -0.00117
Macroeconomic
change_tbill 0.202654 0.117355 1.73 0.084 -0.02736 0.432665
unemployment 0.372469 0.12961 2.87 0.004 0.118438 0.626499
Seasoning
obs 0.002957 0.000519 5.7 0 0.001941 0.003974
Loan Status
forbearance 0.019062 0.006109 3.12 0.002 0.00709 0.031034
deferment -0.0698 0.025397 -2.75 0.006 -0.11958 -0.02002
Program Type
under_2 0.088084 0.02101 4.19 0 0.046905 0.129263
ug_lag_4 -0.01554 0.005431 -2.86 0.004 -0.02619 -0.0049
Other
wa_rate 0.562246 0.07564 7.43 0 0.413994 0.710498
Constant
constant -0.07928 0.013019 -6.09 0 -0.1048 -0.05376
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Section V: Econometric Challenges and Methods 
Given the formatting and type of data in this study, several econometric challenges were 
presented.  The cumulative nature of the default value meant that the results are autocorrelated 
and heteroskedastic.  Autocorrelation means that the error term of one observation is influenced 
by the error term of the prior observation.  The data presented heteroskedasticity in that the 
variances from the mean are not equal across trusts.  Given the data set, we were left to find a 
statistical method that would remain robust in the face of these challenges.  The following details 
the methodology used in this study as it relates to Stata, our statistical analysis software. 
Stata must first be commanded to recognize the data in its panel format.  To do so, the command 
tsset is used and the variable obs is given as the time variable and id is given as the grouping 
variable.  Stata can now utilize its commands for panel data.  To perform the model runs, the 
regression format xtreg is used, which is the regression equation for panel data.  The xtreg 
program can perform fixed effects and random effects regression, given that we have time 
variate and time invariate factors; we use the random effects option.  We then utilize program 
options to modify the xtreg equation to address the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation issues. 
The cluster() option generates standard errors that are robust in the face of heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation.  The cluster identifier is the id variable which controls for the autocorrelation of 
the cumulative default value within each trust.    Modifying the xtreg equation allowed us to 
obtain Rogers standard errors.  These standard errors are based on the work of Froot (1983) and 
Rogers (1993) that shows the assumption of independently distributed residuals can be relaxed in 
the event of autocorrelation within “clusters” (Hocehle) 
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Section VI: Conclusion 
Results from this study indicate that the cumulative default curves for private SLABs are not a 
result of a single determining factor; rather, its shape is determined by how the trust was 
constructed and where it was originated on the economic cycle.  The empirical results show that 
a variety of underwriting variables are significant in determining the cumulative default level of 
the trust.  External economic conditions also impact defaults to a degree likely determined by the 
underlying credit quality of the assets.  By controlling for this array of factors, the final 
multivariate model supports our initial hypothesis that latter vintage trusts performed worse 
relative to their earlier counterparts due to a deterioration in underwriting standards. 
This theory fits in with the overall mentality of capital markets during the time period leading up 
to the financial crisis.  The private student lending industry exhibited similar behavior to that of 
other asset backed security spaces.  While not as systemically crippling as the sub-prime 
mortgage industry, poor quality SLABs were issued en masse in order to generate fee income 
that drove the profitability of the issuers to the detriment of not only the investor, but of the 
borrowers who found themselves in over their heads following graduation.   
The results of this study could be expanded further by investigating the loan level data of the 
studied pools.  While a general understanding of the industry dynamics was gleamed from the 
selected pool level data, individual loan information could depict a more accurate picture of 
default drivers.  For instance, we were surprised that the average loan outstanding per borrower 
did not adversely impact defaults, but it could be that larger loans were made to theoretically 
safer borrowers like medical students.  These questions and more could be answered in a survival 
analysis of individual private student loans. 
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Appendix I: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Description
cum_def  188 0.016 0.019 0.000 0.076 Cumulative Default Rate
tbill  188 0.027 0.017 0.000 0.050 90-Day T-Bill Rate
change_tbill  188 0.003 0.023 -0.050 0.040 Change in T-Bill Since Origination
unemployment  188 0.054 0.011 0.044 0.099 Unemployment Rate
change_u  188 0.001 0.013 -0.015 0.055 Change in Unemployment Since Origination
gdp 188 0.019 0.027 -0.089 0.067 Real GDP Growth
cpi_yoy  188 0.029 0.013 -0.015 0.054 CPI Change YoY
obs  188 6.415 3.444 1.000 12.000 Seasoning
t_bill_  188 0.128 0.136 0.001 0.512 % Priced off T-Bill
fixed_  144 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.008 % Priced w/ Fixed Rate
prime_  188 0.724 0.348 0.007 0.999 % Priced off Prime Rate
no_of_borrowrs 188 156,251       236,729     29,157          104,834       Number of Borrowers
av_out_per_brwr 188 13,138.19$ 1,797.74$ 10,999.00$ 17,971.00$ Average Prin. Per Borrower
no_of_loans  188 127,578       51,210       46,368          216,631       Number of Loans
wa_rem_term  188 202.936 14.341 177 232 Remaing Term (m)
wa_rate  188 0.067 0.022 0.042 0.108 Quoted Rate
wa_t_spread  176 0.031 0.002 0.027 0.033 T-bill Spread
wa_p_spread  176 0.014 0.006 0.004 0.026 Prime Spread
wa_f_spread  132 0.088 0.020 0.060 0.109 Fixed Rate
orig_fico  144 719.25 5.421 714 736 FICO at Origination
orig_fico_sub_630 144 0.134 0.122 0.007 0.387 Sub-Prime or N/A at Origination
cutoff_fico  144 706 5.051 696 712 FICO at Cut-off
cutoff_fico_sub_630 144 0.095 0.017 0.069 0.130 Sub-Prime or N/A at Cut-off
deterioration  144 -0.018 0.007 -0.033 -0.007 FICO Change
in_school  188 0.483 0.266 0.041 0.854 % In School
grace  188 0.220 0.151 0.073 0.489 % in Grace
deferment 188 0.036 0.057 0.000 0.193 % in Deferment
forbearance  188 0.031 0.022 0.002 0.091 % in Forberance
repayment  188 0.230 0.111 0.047 0.406 % in Repayment
post_crisis  188 0.303 0.461 0 1 Dummy Variable (2007+)
key  188 0.234 0.425 0 1 Dummy Variable (KeyCorp)
ug_lag_4  188 0.691 0.128 0.466 0.867 % Undergrad Loans
under_2  188 0.061 0.076 0.000 0.285 % 2-Yr Loans
law  188 0.110 0.060 0.035 0.221 % Law Loans
mba  188 0.042 0.040 0.000 0.153 % MBA Loans
med  188 0.070 0.050 0.014 0.180 % Medical Loans
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